Windows Security Monitoring
1. Overview
Here, we walk through the different stages of the Cyber Kill Chain and show how to investigate each stage using indicators
For details in windows logs ID, see Bo Cyber Logbook - Windows Logs IDs
For different windows event log types, see Bo Cyber Logbook - Windows Event Log Types
Analyzing Windows Log can be daunting. Aside from SIEM, there are some handy tools for this job. We explored those tools in TryHackMe Tempest Room - https://tryhackme.com/room/tempestincident
- Timeline Explorer (allows as to view the events in one place. Similar to Event Viewer but with better view. Need to transfer log to .csv first.)
- Sysmon View (allows us to view log in a process view and see what happened in a timeline. Need to transfer log to .xml first)
2.1 Indicators - Initial Access
Instant Attacks: Research shows that an exposed RDP port is usually discovered by automated botnets and hit with brute-force attempts within one minute of going online.
Indicators - Remote Logon
- RDP (Logon Type 10)
- Network access (type 3)
- successful logon (eventID 4624)
- Failed Logon (enentID 4625)
2.2 Indicators - Phishing and USB
usually involves open files
- Sysmon Event ID 1: Web browser is launched
- Image: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
- ParentImage: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
- Sysmon Event ID 11: A file (usually archive) appears in Downloads
- Image: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
- TargetFilename: C:\Users\User\Downloads\invoice.zip*
- Sysmon Event ID 11: Optionally, the user unarchives files to some folder
- Image: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE (or C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7zG.exe)
- TargetFilename: C:\Users\User\Downloads\invoice.pdf.exe
- Sysmon Event ID 1: The user double-clicks the unarchived file
- Image: C:\Users\User\Downloads\invoice.pdf.exe
- ParentImage: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
2.3 Indicators - Discovery
The first task to detect a potential Discovery is to find a Discovery command, or better, a sequence of commands run during a short period of time. You will see them as process creation events tracked by Sysmon event ID 1 or as new rows in the PowerShell history file. ID 4663 File Access
2.4 Indicators - Collection
In Collection, threat actors don’t just check a system configuration but rather look for specific files and folders such as password, secrect, .pdf, .csv, .temp basically any folder that can store valuable data.
2.5 Indicators - Persistence
Once inside, the attack will want to maintain persistence. Ways including C2, creating new users
New Users
- GUI
lusrmgr.msc
- ID 4720 - user creation
- ID 4697 - service creation
- ID 4698 - scheduled task creation
Extended Readings
Last Modified: 2025-12-28