
It is essential to document what you see in the SIEM and determine if it needs to be escalated.
This is about how an attacker break in (attack vector) using Cyber Kills Chain to provide a linear view. This is helpful to visualize the “story” in high level view.
Similar to UKC, MITRE ATT&CK provides the attacker vector. But ATT&CK dives in more detailed tactics. This is helpful when it comes to forensics.

At 18:30 UTC(WHEN), m.boslan@tryhackme.thm (Martin Boslan, HR lead)(WHO), logged in to their Google Workspace(WHAT) from a trusted LPT-HR-0988 device, and a minute later attempted to download the whole HR folder on their laptop(WHERE), but was blocked by our DLP solution.(WHY)
A minute later, Martin shared the ‘Employee Records (Updated)’ spreadsheet to an unidentified shadow18562@protonmail.thm Protonmail email. Although no events are followed, escalating the alert to communicate with Martin and report the incident to the Compliance team.
| Report Section | 5W Mapping | Example Content |
|---|---|---|
| Time of Activity | WHEN | Initial successful login from suspicious IP: 2025-12-15 10:35 AM UTC. Account disabled: 2025-12-15 11:05 AM UTC. |
| List of Affected Entities | WHO & WHERE | User: Jane Doe (J.Doe@company.com), Finance Department. Asset: User workstation (JD-WKS-04), Account ID 8903. Location: External login from IP 192.0.2.14 (Brazil). |
| List of Attack Indicators |
WHAT & HOW | Suspicious login from an outside country (192.0.2.14). 5 subsequent failed logins across 3 other users immediately following the initial success. Evidence of a successful connection to an external mailbox rule setting via M365 logs. |
| (Below are more of what SOC did to confirm this is a threat) Reason for Classifying as True Positive |
WHAT | Confirmed successful login and subsequent mailbox manipulation from a geolocated risk country, followed by attempts to access other user accounts using the same stolen credentials. |
| Reason for Escalating the Alert | WHY & WHAT (Impact) | The affected account belongs to the Finance team, and evidence suggests an attacker successfully created a mailbox forwarding rule to exfiltrate financial communications. High business risk. |
| Recommended Remediation Actions | HOW (Action) | 1. (SOC) Block IP 192.0.2.14 globally. 2. (Helpdesk) Contact Jane Doe for immediate password reset. 3. (Helpdesk) Re-image workstation JD-WKS-04 to eliminate persistent threats. 4. (SOC/IT) Review all other users on the initial failed login list (if any). |